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TORT LAW-WRONGFUL BIRTH AND WRONGFUL LIFE ACTIONS-
DAMAGES-The Pennsylvania Superior Court has held that although
an infant cannot maintain a cause of action for wrongful life, the
parents of the child can bring an action for wrongful birth and recover
pecuniary expenses incurred in the care and raising of the child, but
may not recover for damages for the emotional and mental distress in-
cident to the birth.
Speck v. Finegold, 408 A.2d 496 (Pa. Super. Ct.), allocatur granted, No.
80-1-16 (Pa. 1979)
Frank Speck, Jr., suffered from neurofibromatosis, a disease which
attacks and forms crippling tumors on the fibrous structures of the
nerves. This genetic disease had been transmitted by Frank to his first
two children.' Concerned with the possible recurrence of this disease in
future children, and with the effect that a recurrence would have upon
the limited economic status of their family, Frank and his wife Dorothy
decided that he should undergo a sterilization procedure The vasec-
tomy procedure was subsequently performed by Dr. Richard A. Fine-
gold, a licensed urologist. Dr. Finegold allegedly assured Frank that
the procedure was successful, and that Frank could engage in sexual
relations with his wife without using contraceptive measures.' There-
after, Dorothy Speck became pregnant. Because the Specks feared that
this child would also be afflicted with neurofibromatosis, Dorothy
entered into an agreement to have an abortion performed by Dr.
Henry Schwartz, a physician and surgeon in the field of obstetrics and
gynecology. Dr. Schwartz performed the abortion and allegedly repre-
sented to the Specks that it had been successful Sometime after the
operation, Mrs. Speck informed Dr. Schwartz that she believed her
pregnancy had not been terminated. Despite Dr. Schwartz' reassurance
that the fetus had been aborted, Dorothy subsequently gave birth to a
premature child, Francine Speck, who was afflicted with the neural
disease.5
The Specks' then filed suit in the Court of Common Pleas of Alle-
1. Speck v. Finegold, 408 A.2d 496, 499 (Pa. Super. Ct.), allocatur granted, No.
80-1-16 (Pa. 1979).
2. Id. at 499-500.
3. Id. at 500.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. The plaintiffs included Frank and Dorothy Speck, their first two daughters,
Valerie and Lee Ann Speck, and the infant Francine Speck, represented by her parent
and guardian Frank Speck, Jr. Id.
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gheny County7 and charged both physicians in a five-count complaint in
trespass and assumpsit. They sought damages on behalf of the infant
Francine for "wrongful life,"8 and on behalf of their two other
daughters for economic hardship? In their own right, the parents
sought to recover the pecuniary expenses they had borne and would
bear in the future for the care and treatment of Francine. The parents
also sought damages for emotional and mental distress suffered as a
result of Francine's birth."
In response to preliminary objections by the defendant-physicians,
the trial court held that no monetary damages could be awarded for
any claims relating to the birth of Francine. The trial court reasoned
that no relief was cognizable in law; that damages for birth were
against public policy; and that such damages were so speculative as to
be immeasurable." On appeal, 1" the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
concluded that the Specks were entitled to claim damages for the
economic costs of raising Francine, but were not entitled to damages
for the mental anguish, emotional distress, and inconvenience caused
by her birth. 3 The superior court affirmed the lower court's dismissal
of Francine's claim for wrongful life.
Judge Cercone, speaking for the majority, 5 noted that the question
presented was not whether the plaintiffs should recover, nor what
damages they were entitled to if they did prevail, but whether the
7. Speck v. Finegold, 124 Pitt. Legal J. 253 (1976).
8. "Wrongful life" is a relatively new tort concept in which the child seeks damages
for being born. The Speck complaint sought damages from both defendants for the emo-
tional and physical anguish Francine had suffered since birth and would suffer in the
future. Plaintiffs' Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court,
filed July 25, 1979, at 3 [hereinafter cited as Plaintiffs' Petition].
9. The claim on behalf of the Specks' first two daughters was withdrawn prior to
the appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. 408 A.2d at 500 n.6.
10. Id. at 500. The parents also claimed damages for the alleged negligence in the
vasectomy and abortion procedures. Frank Speck asserted an individual claim for
damages due to the loss of his wife's services. Id.
11. Id. at 501. The claims by Frank and Dorothy Speck for damages related to the
vasectomy and abortion procedures were set for trial. Id
12. The appeal was certified by the lower court and accepted by the superior court
as a discretionary appeal pursuant to 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 702(b) (Purdon Supp.
1979).
13. 408 A.2d at 508-09.
14. Id. at 508. Plaintiffs have subsequently appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court. The appeal is based on the superior court's denial of damages for emotional and
mental distress incident to Francine's birth, and the refusal to recognize the child's claim
in wrongful life. Plaintiffs' Petition at 1-12.
15. Judges Watkins and Hoffman joined in the majority opinion. Judges Price and
Spaeth filed separate concurring and dissenting opinions. Judges Jacobs and Van der
Voort did not participate in the decision of the case.
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plaintiffs' complaint stated a recognizable cause of action in law. 6
After reviewing the case law on wrongful life and wrongful birth ac-
tions, 7 Judge Cercone concluded that the weight of precedent dictated
recognition of the tort claim for wrongful birth, but disallowance of a
cause of action for wrongful life. 8 In addressing the infant's claim for
wrongful life, the court admitted that the defendants' acts of negli-
gence were the proximate cause of her birth. However, the infant had
failed to state a legally cognizable cause of action for two reasons.
First, there is no precedent holding that a child has a fundamental
right to be born as a whole, functional human being. 9 Second, the in-
fant's claim for damages did not comport with the traditional remedy
afforded to a party injured by the negligence of another; that is, she
could not be placed in the position she would have occupied but for the
negligence of the defendants. To do so would require that damages be
calculated by comparing the value of life in an impaired state to the
value of nonexistence."0 The court concluded that because the law was
incapable of resolving such an enigmatic issue, the infant's cause of ac-
tion for wrongful life was not cognizable in law.2'
Turning to the parent's cause of action for wrongful birth, the court
initially noted that the trial court had "miss[ed] the point" by basing
its decision on the worth and sanctity of life, as that was not in dis-
pute.' Rather, the question was whether or not the doctors were negli-
gent in performing the vasectomy and abortion. Judge Cercone found
that public policy had long been the reason for denying recovery since
abortion was against the law. However, this policy view was largely
eliminated by the United States Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connec-
ticut' and Roe v. Wade.' In Roe, the Court held that the constitutional
right to privacy protected the woman's qualified right to terminate her
pregnancy. Judge Cercone reasoned that if public policy is not violated
by termination of the pregnancy, then a fortiori the public policy could
16. 408 A.2d at 508.
17. Wrongful birth is a claim brought by the parents of the unplanned child for
economic and emotional damages attributable to the negligent failure to prevent the
child's conception and/or birth. Id. at 502. See generally Robertson, Civil Liability Arising
from "Wrongful Birth" Following an Unsuccessful Sterilization Operation, 4 AM. J. L. &
MED. 131 (1978).
18. 408 A.2d at 507.
19. Id. at 508.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 503.
23. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (state statute proscribing use of contraceptives is an unconsti-
tutional intrusion upon right to privacy).
24. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (state criminal abortion statute prohibiting abortions at any
stage of pregnancy except to save the life of the mother is unconstitutional).
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not be violated by acts designed to avoid conception.25 As further evi-
dence that sterilization and abortion were not contrary to public
policy, the court cited various statutes which regulate the activities."
Having established that public policy no longer barred the parents'
wrongful birth action, the court then examined existing precedent for
the controlling legal principles.
Judge Cercone cited Christenson v. Thornby7 as the first case to
permit a cause of action for wrongful birth resulting from an improp-
erly performed sterilization. 8 However, the Christenson court did not
consider what damages could be recovered. Nevertheless, dicta from
the opinion influenced courts in later decisions to deny the parent's
claim for the economic costs of raising an unplanned child. 9 Judge Cer-
cone was not influenced by this dicta, as he found Christenson to be
distinguishable from Speck. Unlike Speck, Christenson involved the
husband's desire to protect his wife's life from the dangers of another
childbirth. Because the wife was not injured by the birth of a healthy
child, the wrongful life claim in Christenson was remote from the pur-
pose of the husband's sterilization.2 In Speck, the plaintiffs did not
want the child, and sought the operative procedures solely to prevent
a new birth. Judge Cercone noted that after Christenson, several
courts denied recovery even when the child was unwanted or un-
planned, usually because the judiciary did not think itself capable of
accurately weighing the intangible benefits of motherhood and father-
hood against the alleged emotional and monetary injuries.2 This view
prevailed until a California court, in Custodio v. Bauer,"2 held that
parents could recover damages stemming from a negligent steriliza-
tion. The Custodio court recognized the parents' right to recover not
only costs arising out of the negligent medical procedure, but also to
recover all costs which reasonably followed the negligent act, including
the cost of rearing an unplanned child.2
25. Id. at 504 n.16.
26. Id. at 504 n.17.
27. 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934).
28. 408 A.2d at 504.
29. The relevant portion of the Christenson opinion states:
[T]he plaintiff has been blessed with the fatherhood of another child. The expenses
alleged are incident to the bearing of a child, and their avoidance is remote from
the avowed purpose of the operation. As well might the plaintiff charge defendant
with the cost of nurture and education of the child during its minority.
Id. at 126, 255 N.W. at 622 (emphasis added).
30. 408 A.2d at 505.
31. Id.
32. 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
33. The Custodio court held that damages incident to a failed sterilization include the
cost of the unsuccessful operation, expenses incurred for the treatment of physical com-
plications, and pain and suffering. Id. at 323-25, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476-77.
Vol. 18:10091012
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After Custodio, several decisions amplified the manner in which
damages were to be calculated. In some jurisdictions, the parent's
recovery was reduced by any benefits conferred upon them by the
child.u In other jurisdictions, no specific limitations were placed on the
amount of recovery allowable for the raising of the child.' From this,
Judge Cercone stated that ample precedent supported the parents'
right to maintain a "wrongful birth" claim.8 Judge Cercone concluded
that as in all actions sounding in tort, the parents need only demon-
strate the existence of a duty, and that the breach of duty proximately
caused their damages.
Applying this tort precept to the pleading, the majority found that
but for the defendants' breach of duty to properly treat and advise,
the Specks would not have been required to make the alleged expendi-
tures." Thus, the parents were entitled to recover the economic expen-
ditures caused by the defendants' negligence. Turning to the parents'
claim for damages due to emotional disturbance and mental stress,
Judge Cercone concluded that this claim should be denied. The major-
ity was unable to differentiate the emotional and mental distress suf-
fered by the Specks from the suffering of any parent who raises a
child, particularly when the child is mentally or physically defective by
reason of a natural disease or accident. Nor could Francine's status as
unwanted alter the sameness in the quality and nature of the stress
experienced in the every day work of parenthood. Judge Cercone con-
cluded with the statement that all parents suffer some degree of stress
34. 408 A.2d at 506. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Sup. 126, 266 A.2d
204 (1976) (defendant allowed to mitigate damages by arguing benefits of child); Sherlock
v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977) (reasonable costs of rearing child offset
by value of child's aid, comfort and society); Howard v. Lecher, 53 App. Div. 2d 420, 386
N.Y.S.2d 460 (1976) (benefits of parenthood weighed against alleged injuries).
35. 408 A.2d at 506-07. See, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511
(1971) (economic costs of rearing child recoverable); Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super.
69, 344 A.2d 336 (1975) (costs of rearing child allowed); Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 App. Div.
2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1975) (educational and medical costs of raising child allowed).
36. 408 A.2d at 506.
37. Id. at 506-07.
38. Id. at 508. It is not clear whether recovery was intended to extend to the future
expenses of raising the child. A comprehensive reading of the majority opinion indicates
that recovery includes future costs. However, there is language suggesting that only past
expenses are recoverable. The relevant language states that "but for the defendants'
breach of duty to properly treat and advise plaintiff-parents they would not have been re-
quired to undergo the expenditures alleged." Id. (emphasis added). Judge Price had some
difficulty understanding the extent of recovery envisioned by the majority, remarking
that "if the majority opinion is being properly interpreted by this writer," he would dis-
sent from allowing the recovery of past, present and future costs. Id. at 510 (Price, J., con-
curring and dissenting) (emphasis added).
39. Id. at 509.
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and that emotional anguish is a normal, uncompensable price of being a
parent. Therefore, to permit recovery for the Specks' emotional
anguish would be allowing them a societal advantage not available in
other parenthood situations.0
In a separate and concurring opinion, Judge Price objected to that
portion of the majority opinion allowing recovery of the past, present,
and future costs of raising Francine." Judge Price stated that public
policy precluded any notion that the birth of a child could be deemed
as a compensable wrong to the parents. He also concurred with the
majority's denial of the parents' claim for emotional distress and men-
tal anguish and the refusal to recognize the infant's cause of action for
wrongful life.
In his concurring and dissenting opinion, Judge Spaeth agreed with
the majority's refusal to recognize the infant's cause of action for
wrongful life . 3 He reasoned that although the defendants' negligence
had allowed Francine to be born, she had suffered no injury that the
law treats as compensable. He noted, however, that none of the other
claims made by the Specks suffered from the same problem." The
Specks had decided to forego more children because of the prospects of
economic hardship and their fear of the hereditary disease. When the
child was born, their fears materialized. Since Francine's birth was the
direct and foreseeable result of the defendant's negligence, Judge
Spaeth concluded that the extent of the damages was also direct and
foreseeable. In his view, the jury should be permitted to award all
direct and foreseeable damages reduced only by an amount represent-
ing the benefit that a child brings to parents."5
Judge Spaeth also criticized the majority's reasoning that the
Specks' claim for emotional and mental distress should be denied
because their anguish was identical to that suffered by all parents." To
40. Id. The court did not elaborate nor explain what it meant by "societal advantage."
41. Id. at 509-10 (Price, J., concurring and dissenting).
42. Id. at 511 (Price, J., concurring and dissenting).
43. Id. (Spaeth, J., concurring and dissenting). However, Judge Spaeth distinguished
Speck from cases in which a child would have been born healthy but for a doctor's negli-
gent administration of a drug or failure to treat a condition in utero. In the latter type of
wrongful life case he believed that the infant should be able to assert a claim. Since Fran-
cine's disease was hereditary, Judge Spaeth agreed with the majority. Id.
44. Id. at 513 (Spaeth, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Spaeth would allow
recovery for damages connected with the vasectomy and abortion procedures, the loss of
Mrs. Speck's companionship and services, and expenses for the birth and raising of the
child. Id.
45. Id. at 512 (Spaeth, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Spaeth added that if the
plurality opinion was properly understood as not applying the benefits rule to the
damages, he would disagree with their position. Id.
46. See text accompanying notes 39-40 supra.
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him, this reasoning was puzzling since a similar argument could be
made in any tort case. The more conventional view, according to Judge
Spaeth, is that the right to damages cannot be defeated because others
may suffer the same injury.47 The proper inquiry, he pointed out, is
whether negligence caused the damage and not whether the damage
can be suffered by others in the absence of negligence. 8
In cases involving the negligent performance of a sterilization or
abortion, it is generally recognized that the tortfeasor is liable for all
damages which ordinarily result from the tort.49 However, there is con-
siderable conflict surrounding the underlying issues of wrongful life
and wrongful birth. Generally, courts have not recognized the wrongful
life action because it is judicially impossible to measure the value of
life versus nonexistence."0 The courts have been more receptive to the
parental claim of wrongful birth, treating it as a cognizable claim for
damages.5 From the parents' standpoint, the wrongful birth claim af-
fords the opportunity for a more complete recovery than a simple
negligence action, since the economic costs of raising the child and
damages for the emotional and mental anguish incident to the birth
and rearing of the infant may be recoverable in a wrongful birth ac-
tion.52
47. 408 A.2d at 513.
48. Id. at 514.
49. Damages that are generally granted in negligent sterilization or abortion cases
are the expense of the surgical procedure, pain and suffering consequent to the failure of
the operation or continuing pregnancy, medical complications during pregnancy, delivery
costs, lost wages, and loss of consortium. See, e.g., Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698,
707-08, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652, 657-59 (1976); Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 323, 59
Cal. Rptr. 463, 475-76 (1967); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 261, 187 N.W.2d 511, 520
(1971); Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 App. Div. 2d 230, 233, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265, 269 (1974);
Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 45, 356 N.E.2d 496, 499 (1976).
50. See, e.g., Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 2d 698, 706-07, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652, 656-57
(1976); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8, 13-14 (Del. Super. 1978); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49
N.J. 22, 28, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (1967); Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 58 Misc. 2d
432, 435, 296 N.Y.S.2d 41, 44 (1968), modified, 35 App. Div. 2d 531, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502
(1970), aff'd 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972). But see Curlender v.
Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, hearing denied (1980).
51. See Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 2d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976) (economic
costs of family due to birth of child are compensable); Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d
303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967) (economic change in family status due to child's birth is com-
pensable); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971) (costs of rearing child
ascertainable; benefits rule of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979) applies in
making damages determination); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413
N.Y.S.2d 895(1978) (costs of rearing child allowed). But see Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J.
22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967) (complex interaction between benefit and loss precludes judicial
measurement of damages).
52. See Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336 (1975) (damages
allowed for any loss or damage proximately resulting from negligent sterilization pro-
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The Speck court recognized that once a duty and its breach are
established, the tortfeasor is liable for those damages which are
proven to be the consequence of the breach."3 However, the court
refused to apply fully this general tort doctrine by not recognizing the
parents claim for emotional and mental distress.' The Specks sought
the sterilization and abortion procedures to avoid the mental anguish
and economic hardship that would follow the birth of another defective
child into their family. Therefore, the emotional and mental anguish
following the birth of the afflicted child was a highly foreseeable result
of the doctors' negligence.
The Speck court did acknowledge that the defendant physicians
owed a duty to the Specks, and that the doctors had breached the
duty.5 Although the majority accepted the Specks' claim that the doc-
tors' breach of duty resulted in economic damages, the court refused to
consider the claim of emotional and mental anguish to be of a nature
requiring redress. The sole purpose for which the Specks sought the
surgical procedures was to avoid Francine's birth; yet the court did not
view this as a fact that distinguished the character of the Specks'
anguish from the nature of stress generally experienced by all
parents.56
In the recent decision of Sinn v. Burd,57 in which damages for mental
and emotional anguish were at issue in another context, the Penn-
cedure, including costs, emotional anguish, and physical inconvenience of rearing the
infant). Compare Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979) (damages allowed for
emotional distress and mental anguish but disallowed for economic costs of rearing the
child) with Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978)
(pecuniary damages allowed as a consequence of birth but policy reasons preclude the
parents from recovering damages for emotional anguish and mental distress incident to
the infant's birth).
53. 408 A.2d at 508. The court referred to the application of the tort doctrine as "ax-
iomatic." Id.
54. The Speck court stated: "Unlike the measurability of pecuniary loss to which
plaintiff-parents are entitled, there is no legal realm of accountability to which they can look
for the claimed mental and emotional damages arising out of the birth of their child .. Id.
at 509.
55. Id. at 508.
56. The majority reasoned that "Itlhe fact that plaintiffs did not want Francine does
not alter the sameness in the quality and nature of pain and suffering experienced in the
everyday work of parenthood." Id. at 509.
57. 404 A.2d 672 (Pa. 1979). In Sinn, the supreme court abolished the zone of danger
requirement for bystander recovery that it had previously established in Neiderman v.
Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970). Neiderman modified the earlier Pennsylvania im-
pact rule which required a person to be physically harmed before a claim for mental and
emotional stress could be successfully asserted. In modifying this rule, the Neiderman
court developed the zone of danger theory under which a plaintiff could recover for the
emotional and mental trauma incident to the negligent act, even if not in immediate
danger of physical impact by the negligent force.
Recent Decisions
sylvania Supreme Court rejected reasoning similar to that put forth by
the Speck court. In Sinn, the court held that due to advances in
medical science, 5' emotional and mental distress was both a
demonstrable injury and one capable of measurement. 59 Furthermore,
the court stated that stress incident to a negligent act must be
recognized as a compensable injury."0 The court concluded that it
would be an arbitrary and indefensible position not to recognize that
negligence could foreseeably result in emotional anguish. 1
In Sinn, the court considered and rejected the argument that
recovery for emotional distress depended upon the parents' ability to
differentiate their stress from that experienced by all parents.2 The
differentiation requirement was initially advanced by the New York
Court of Appeals in Tobin v. Grossman.3 While discussing the
possibility of losing a child, the Tobin court held that because emo-
tional and mental trauma was an inherent risk of child rearing,
recovery should be denied." The Sinn court criticized this rationale as
callous and harsh." Furthermore, the court stated that the Tobin court
ignored a foreseeable response to tortious conduct. Hence, not only
did the Speck court refuse to recognize a foreseeable injury directly
flowing from a negligent act, but it did so using the very rationale the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court conclusively rejected in Sinn v. Burd.
Moreover, the logic used by the Sinn court is not limited to
bystander situations, as evidenced by the recent decision in Berman v.
58. 404 A.2d at 679. See Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 613, 249 N.E.2d 419, 422,
301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 556 (1969) (mental trauma can now be diagnosed almost as well as physical
trauma). See generally Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MICH. L.
REV. 497 (1922); Simons, Psychic Injury and the Bystander: The Transcontinental Dispute
Between California and New York, 50 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1 (1976); Comment, Negligently
Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case for an Independent Tort, 59 GEo. L.J. 1237 (1975).
59. 404 A.2d at 679.
60. Id. at 683, 686.
61. Id. at 683.
62. Id. at 686. See note 56 supra.
63. 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969). In Tobin, a mother was
denied her claim for emotional and mental stress suffered when her child was struck by a
negligently operated car. The mother did not witness the accident, but heard brakes
screech and ran outside in time to see the injured child. The court denied the mother's
claim, stating: "This is the risk [of indirect harm] of living and bearing children. It is
enough that the law establishes liability in favor of those directly or intentionally
harmed." Id. at 619, 249 N.E.2d at 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 561-62.
64. Id at 619, 249 N.E.2d at 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 561-62.
65. The Sinn court stated that "we conclude we cannot accept the callous view of the
Tobin court that the possibility of a sudden and violent termination of a young life is a
risk assumed in child rearing and does not require recovery where mental distress results
from the witnessing of such an event." 404 A.2d at 686.
66. Id. at 683.
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Allan. 7 In Berman, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized a claim
for wrongful birth brought by the parents of a child afflicted with
Down's Syndrome. 8 In part, Berman modified an earlier decision by
the same court in Gleitman v. Cosgrove,9 where a cause of action for
wrongful birth was not allowed. 0 The Berman court found the
defendant-physicians' breach of duty to properly advise and treat the
parents to be the cause of the plaintiffs' mental anguish, and allowed a
cause of action for this tort.71 Significantly, the court limited its inquiry
to whether the mental anguish was a foreseeable result of the defen-
dant's negligence, and did not find it necessary to further distinguish
the nature of the plaintiffs' stress from that experienced by all
parents."2
The Speck decision represents an unfortunate departure from prin-
ciples of tort law which, if applied, would dictate that the Specks be
compensated for the emotional and mental damage they not only
foresaw, but took steps to avoid. Because other parents may ex-
perience mental anguish as a normal price for rearing children cannot
explain why the Specks, who had valid reasons for not conceiving and
giving birth to another child, are forced to bear the abnormally high
price, both financially" and emotionally, of seeing their fears
materialize.
Marcia E. Heister
67. 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
68. The parents in Berman sued their physicians for both wrongful life and wrongful
birth. They alleged that it was negligent for the doctor to fail to inform them of prenatal
tests which could detect a defective fetus, thereby denying them the opportunity to
decide if the fetus should be aborted. The mother, being thirty-eight years old, was in an
age group with a high incidence of birth defects. Id. at 424-25, 404 A.2d at 10.
69. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
70. In Gleitman, a defective child was born to a mother who had contracted rubella
during early pregnancy. Despite this disease, she was assured by the defendants that
there was no danger to the fetus. The wrongful life and wrongful birth claims were re-
jected by the court on the basis of immeasurability of damages. 49 N.J. at 27-31, 227 A.2d at
692-94.
71. 80 N.J. at 433, 404 A.2d at 14. The Berman court did not allow recovery for
medical and other costs involved in raising the defective child, reasoning that the award
would constitute a windfall to the parents and create an unreasonable burden on the
physicians' financial resources. Id. at 432, 404 A.2d at 14.
72. The defendants' failure in Berman to inform plaintiffs of a prenatal test deprived
the parents of knowledge that was essential to their decision of whether to continue the
pregnancy. The court found the physicians liable for their failure to provide this choice to
the parents. By comparison, the parents in Speck had already reached a decision, but
were precluded from its fulfillment by the physicians' negligence.
73. The majority opinion clearly indicates that the Specks can recover past financial
expenditures. Beyond that, the opinion never explicitly holds that future economic costs
can be recovered, although the opinion is susceptible of such an interpretation. See note
38 supra.
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